We propose a new model of simultaneous price competition, where …rms o¤er personalized prices to consumers, who then independently decide which o¤er to accept, if any. Even with decreasing returns to scale, this decentralized market mechanism has a unique equilibrium, which is independent of any exogenously imposed rule for rationing or demand sharing. In equilibrium, the …rms behave as if they were price takers, leading to the competitive outcome (but positive pro…ts). Given the unique result for the short-run competition, we are able to investigate the …rms'ex ante capital investment decisions. While there is underinvestment in the long-run equilibrium, the overall outcome is more competitive than one-shot Cournot competition.
Introduction
In this paper we take a fresh look at markets where the …rms compete in prices to attract consumers. This is a fundamental topic of industrial organization that has been thoroughly investigated, ever since the original contribution of Cournot (1838). 1 Our excuse for re-opening the case is that we o¤er a new way of modelling price competition, which naturally leads to a unique equilibrium with price equal to marginal cost, even when the latter is increasing. The innovation we propose is to allow the …rms to personalize their prices. The resulting conceptual advantage is not the feasibility of …rst-degree price discrimination -which does not occur in equilibrium -, rather, the ‡exibility allowed by personalized pricing ensures that competition is cut-throat even when attracting too much demand is harmful (because of increasing marginal costs). The enhanced level of competition leads to a unique (symmetric) equilibrium with all consumers being o¤ered the competitive price. Notably, we need not make arbitrary assumptions about either a rationing rule: each …rm serves the very consumers who accept its o¤er; or a demand sharing rule: when a consumer receives two equal o¤ers she randomizes according to her (endogenously derived) equilibrium strategy. Armed with a solution to price competition, we revisit the question of how competitive the outcome of two-stage competition -…rst technology choice, then (personalized) price competition -is relative to a one-shot Cournot model. We show that despite the competitive result of the …rst stage, in the two-stage game there are still distortions: there is underinvestment in the long-run factor. Nonetheless -except if the technology is Leontie¤ -the overall outcome is more competitive than the Cournot outcome.
Deconstructing the Bertrand Paradox
Take the standard model of simultaneous price competition between two producers of a homogeneous good at constant and identical marginal cost, commonly referred to as the Bertrand duopoly. This model has a unique equilibrium, where both …rms price at marginal/average cost, thereby earning zero pro…t. While the model itself seems realistic, the result is clearly not: even though there are only two competitors, they have no market power at all. The literature has dealt with this issue by enriching the model, incorporating product di¤erentiation, price-quantity bidding, privately known cost functions or dynamic competition. While these generalized models are useful in their own right, it is nonetheless conceptually relevant to note that actually nothing is amiss in the basic model.
Recall that, assuming that …rms are price-takers in the input markets, when average costs are decreasing in output we have a natural monopoly: there is room for only one …rm in the market. The "paradoxical"situation with constant marginal cost is the limiting case of this, where two …rms can "just"…t. When average costs are increasing, marginal costs are above average cost and -as we will discuss below in detail -…rms do make positive pro…ts in the Bertrand duopoly, despite still pricing at marginal cost.
The seemingly innocuous "simplifying" assumption of constant marginal costs actually leads to a non-generic, knife-edge situation, just between the cases where a duopoly can make pro…ts or losses. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that constant marginal costs lead to zero pro…ts in oligopoly: there is no paradox.
Let us re-examine the Bertrand duopoly when marginal costs are increasing. As shown by Dastidar (1995) , this scenario is not the panacea either, as it leads to multiple equilibria. There exists a range of prices, such that if a …rm charges one of them the other …rm's best response is to charge the same price. 2 Denoting demand by D(:) and cost by C(:), the lowest equilibrium price, p, is where the sellers splitting the demand 3 just break even: pD(p) = 2C(D(p)=2). 4 The highest one, p, is where serving the entire demand gives the same pro…t as splitting it:
The indeterminacy of this result is rather severe. For instance, if demand is Q = 1 p and cost is quantity squared, the lowest and highest equlibrium prices are p = (it is just a coincidence that it equals p). 3 Dastidar assumes equal sharing of the demand for …rms charging the same price. 4 Ignoring the choke-price root.
pD(p)=2 C(D(p)=2).
The reason for this plethora of equilibria is the obligation of a deviant …rm to serve all comers at the announced price. With constant marginal costs this is not an issue. However, when average costs are increasing, satisfying the entire market demand -what happens if a …rm undercuts its competitor -may not be an advantageous proposition. With deviations discouraged, equilibria thrive.
In order to regain a unique equilibrium price, we could make use of Dixon's (1992) 5 modi…ed Bertrand-Edgeworth game, where in addition to their price the …rms also announce the maximum quantity they are willing to sell at it. Together with a demand sharing rule 6 and a freely chosen 7 rationing rule, this resolves Dastidar's problem that downward deviations are too costly, and by having …rms commit to supply -if needed -more than their share in the competitive equilibrium, it removes the incentive for rivals to increase their price above the competitive one (residual demand is zero), thus destroying the Edgeworth Cycle.
In this paper, we propose an alternative model of price competition -also supporting the competitive outcome as the unique equilibrium outcome -where the …rms make a personalized price o¤er to each consumer. There are a number of reasons for doing this:
Firstly, from a conceptual point of view, we feel that our model is closer in spirit to "pure"price competition, as quantities are not explicitly set, and no consumer faces the risk of being rationed after accepting a price o¤er.
Second, from the game-theoretic point of view, Dixon's model is subsumed in ours. If we restrict attention to price schedules that take only two values, a su¢ ciently high one, at which no one buys, and an "interior" price, then 5 See Allen and Hellwig (1986) as well. 6 He assumes equal sharing, though he also assumes that all …rms have the same cost function.
In fact, it is straightforward to see from the proofs of his Lemmas 1 and 2 that with asymmetric costs and equal sharing, his model generically has no equilibrium. To regain existence the sharing rule must be in proportion of competitive supply, see below. 7 Dixon makes the shrewd -but hardly realistic -assumption that individual demand is proportional to income. This ensures that residual demand is independent of the choice of rationing rule. Nonetheless, some rationing rule is still necessary for the operation of the market.
such price schedules are equivalent to a single price and a maximum quantity. 8 Thus, Proposition 1 below shows that the larger strategy set does not lead to a di¤erent equilibrium price (and neither does it destroy the existence of a deterministic equilibrium price), while it also implies Dixon's result.
Third, in some applications -like certain services, intermediate goods markets, or Internet commerce, where via cookies sellers can price discriminate -the option of setting personalized prices is more realistic than posted prices. In fact, as we will see, we need not assume that the price schedule be measurable at the individual level. For example, …rms with many, geographically distributed, outlets potentially charging di¤erent prices would also …t our model,
barring "integer problems". We can also think of the personalized o¤ers as proxies for personally negotiated deals, even in labor markets.
Fourth, our model leads to a decentralized implementation, where each consumer decides individually which price to accept in equilibrium, so there is no need to appeal to demand sharing rules and to an "invisible hand" clearing the market.
Finally, in the absence of capacity constraints (self-imposed or otherwise) our equilibrium is not hostage to an exogenous choice of rationing rule.
In the remainder of this Introduction we give a brief overview of the most relevant literature. We then present our model in detail in Section 2. Section 3 derives the short-run equilibrium, while Section 4 looks at the long-run consequences. We conclude with a brief discussion of our results.
A brief literature review
The traditional approach toward the resolution of the Bertrand Paradox -pioneered by Edgeworth (1897) -has been to allow …rms to choose the quantity they are willing to sell at the price they set. In its pure form, this leads to an Edgeworth Cycle, or, in modern parlance, a mixed strategy equilibrium (c.f. Levitan and Shubik, 1972) : Even if the equilibrium is unique, the range of prices o¤ered is large 9 and the two …rms generically set di¤erent prices. Allowing …rms to set supply functions (complete quantity-price schedules) does not eliminate severe multiplicity either (c.f.
Klemperer and Meyer, 1989).
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Building on the insights gained from the analysis of Bertrand competition with capacity constraints by Levitan and Shubik (1972) , Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) constructed a two-stage model where …rms …rst commit to capacity levels (or simply produce prior to the realization of demand) and then price competition follows. The remarkable outcome is that in the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium prices and quantities (produced and sold) are the same as those that would result in a one-shot Cournot competition. Unfortunately, Davidson and Deneckere (1986) showed that this result is not robust to the choice of rationing rule: Kreps and Scheinkman used the "e¢ cient" or "surplus-maximizing" rule, where the demand is served starting from the highest valuation buyer. As this rule results in the most pessimistic residual demand curve for a …rm with the higher price, for any other rule the outcome is more competitive than the Cournot equilibrium.
Looking at competition from the long-run perspective is indeed insightful and it is the main contribution of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) . However, selecting the "…xed factor" to be a choice of capacity is not only unnecessarily restrictive but it is also somewhat misleading. The latter weakness comes from the undue prominence capacity choice gives to rationing. Allowing for the short-run cost curve to be smooth, avoids rationing altogether as the …rms are able to supply -within reasonable limits, see below -the entire demand, even if they wished not to. CabonDhersin and Drouhin (2014) were the …rst to look at a two-stage model with "soft capacity constraints". 11 In the …rst period the …rms choose -at a cost -a CobbDouglas production function for the second stage. They use Dastidar's (1995) model of price competition in the second stage, which they re…ne by selecting the collusive (payo¤-dominant) equilibrium.
Personalized pricing
Speci…cally, we assume that there is a set of N producers, indexed by J = 1; 2; :::; N , with increasing, strictly convex, twice di¤erentiable costs functions, C J (q), represents consumer i's probability of accepting the o¤er received from …rm J: P J (i).
We say that the outcome of (P; ) is measurable if for each J,
Note that the individual consumers are full- ‡edged players in the game and it is their -endogenously derived -equilibrium strategies that determine how demand is shared among …rms asking for the same (lowest) price. At the same time, …rms are committed to satisfy the (unit) demand of all the consumers who accept their o¤er, thereby eliminating the need for a rationing rule (see Remark 2 below).
The short-run equilibrium
The main result of this section is that -assuming that it is not prohibitively costly 14 for any N 1 …rms to serve the market demand at p -our decentralized price setting mechanism leads to the competitive outcome.
We prove the following result in the Appendix:
< 1 for all I 6 = J, the unique measurable equilibrium outcome in pure price schedules is such that all trades are at the competitive price and …rms sell in proportion to their competitive supply: …rm J's o¤er of p is accepted by a measure S J (p ) of consumers.
While the equilibrium outcome is unique, there are multiple ways of implementing it. The leading contender is the (unique) equilibrium, where both …rms and consumers use symmetric strategies: all …rms post the competitive price, P J (:) p , and the consumers who are willing to buy, v i p , use a mixed strategy of accep- 13 Equivalently, if
14 See Remark 3. 15 When a continuum of agents each randomize over a common …nite set of actions, there is no guarantee that the set of agents that choose certain action (in this case, accepting trading with seller J) is measurable. In that case, payo¤s and best responses cannot be de…ned. In order to avoid what is but a technical issue, we will only consider strategy pro…les where this indeterminacy does not arise. The concept of "equilibrium"implicitly requires measurability of outcomes, anyway. tance, where Firm J's o¤er is accepted with probability S J (p )=D(p ) that equals its share of the aggregate competitive supply of the …rms making the lowest o¤er.
If there are several …rms that are not too unequal, there exists another focal equilibrium strategy pro…le -which minimizes the number of (serious) o¤ers made -where the …rms coordinate so that each consumer receive exactly two o¤ers of p (and thus they make twice as many o¤ers as they wish to sell: 2S J (p )), who then accept with 50-50 chance. Note that, despite the di¤erent mixed acceptance strategy, demand is still shared in proportion of the competitive supplies. This observation highlights that it is the …rms'and consumers'strategies together that determine how demand is shared.
Before developing the intuition for this result, some important observations are in order:
Remark 1 We have seen that in order to achieve endogenous rationing in equilibrium, we need either the consumers to be able to calculate the …rms' competitive supplies, or the …rms to coordinate on which consumers to target. While, gametheoretically speaking, both of these characteristics are …ne, they need some justi…-cation from the viewpoint of realism. The …rst possibility could be rationalized, for example, by …rms advertising in proportion to their size/competitive supply. Coordination between …rms can be a real-life situation, for example, where the unit-demand consumers are actually aggregated into retailers and the …rms can observe which retailer their competitors intend to sell to. In any case, we wish to underscore that this is a conceptual exercise: our goal is to understand price competition in the most abstract setting.
Remark 2
The symmetric equilibrium strategies involve commitment to o¤er the good 16 for the competitive price to all consumers (who -if v i p -then use a mixed strategy of acceptance in proportion to the …rms' competitive supply).
17 16 This may consist of a substitute good or a "rain check". The crucial assumption is that a consumer who has accepted an o¤er no longer has unsatis…ed demand in the market. 17 This many o¤ers are not needed in general. The necessary condition is that all buyers receive at least two o¤ers.
Thanks to the Law of Large Numbers eliminating uncertainty, the highest realized demand for …rm I following a unilateral deviation by …rm J is
, which by assumption is still feasible to satisfy. Following a deviation by a competitor, a …rm would prefer to ration consumers. There must be either su¢ cient reputational concerns or enforced consumer protection regulation in place to ensure compliance.
Remark 3 For clarity, we have set the limit of feasibility at in…nite total cost.
One can replace in…nity by any other number that determines the limit of feasibility for satisfying residual demand, depending on the circumstances (for example, the bankruptcy constraint in Dixon, 1992) . Note that the more …rms there are, the lower is the residual demand following a unilateral deviation and the easier is to satisfy the feasibility constraint. If the constraint is not satis…ed, it is not possible to avoid rationing.
Remark 4 Unlike in standard Bertrand competition, the strategies sustaining the equilibrium are not weakly dominated: making o¤ers to fewer consumers would decrease pro…ts. Nonetheless, it is true that, due to the commitment to serve all accepted o¤ers, a deviating competitor could provoke a serious loss in pro…ts. Thus, a …rm might worry about a kind of "strategic risk", in the spirit of risk dominance, even if our equilibrium is unique. However, it is easy to see that, if we actually incorporate such a risk into the analysis, there is no qualitative change in the equilibrium and the -unique and common -price moves continuously with the probability of "mistakes". For example, if each o¤er got lost with probability ", the new equilibrium price for a symmetric duopoly would become the solution of
Alternatively, if all the o¤ers of a competitor could be lost with probability , the new price would solve p(
Remark 5 Note that, if we assume that consumer valuations are observable, our mechanism allows …rms to perfectly price discriminate. Proposition 1 would still apply: marginal cost pricing continues to be the equilibrium outcome, so competition drives out price discrimination. Unlike in the case of monopoly, the lack/presence of the ability to price discriminate has no e¢ ciency consequences.
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In the unique equilibrium outcome all consumers willing to trade do so at the competitive price, and all …rms end up with the same marginal cost, equalling it. As a result, …rms do not want to undo any sales and, while lowering some price o¤ers would lead to further sales, this would lead to a loss, as marginal cost would exceed this price. This is rather straightforward, and in fact it also holds in the posted price setting: the competitive price is contained in Dastidar's interval. 19 What is more intricate is to see that all equilibria must satisfy the condition that (common) price equals (common) marginal cost. Let us break this claim down into two pieces. 19 The exact description of Dastidar's interval (especially its lower bound) depends on whether there are …xed costs of production (for simplicity we assume not: C J (0) = 0) and on the rule according to which …rms charging the same (lowest) price split demand. For consistency with our endogenously derived equilibrium sharing, we adopt the assumption made by Vives (1999) -see Dastidar (1997) as well -that the split is in proportion to their price taking supply (S J (p)): …rm J's share as a proportion of the aggregate output if …rms in set the lowest price (p) is
. With this assumption, the Dastidar interval is straightforward to describe (see Vives' note 7 in Chapter 5), as -by construction -in equilibrium all …rms must produce:
The lowest Dastidar equilibrium price is the lowest commonly charged price where all …rms make non-negative pro…ts. As at the competitive price they all have the same marginal cost (p ) which is above average cost (as C J (0) = 0 and C 00 J > 0), p < p . The highest Dastidar price is the highest commonly charged price at which no …rm would prefer to serve all the demand. As at the competitive price they all charge at marginal cost, any additional amount sold would strictly decrease their pro…ts, implying that they would strictly prefer not to serve all the demand. Thus, by the continuity of payo¤s, p < p.
subset of consumers. Note that the same arguments fail with posted prices, as then a …rm's deviation choices are to undercut all …rms for all consumers or to lose out to everyone and sell nothing.
Finally, let us argue why all …rms should have the same marginal cost in equilibrium. Assume otherwise: then a lower-marginal-cost (lmc) …rm could undercut a higher-marginal-cost (hmc) …rm for a subset of its consumers with a price which is higher than lmc's marginal cost and increase its pro…t -as the hmc …rm would not make any o¤er below its marginal cost and it must make a positive measure of sales in equilibrium.
The long run
Now that we have a unique prediction for the outcome of Bertrand competition in the short run, we can turn to the question of the choice of -or investment in -productive technology, which was considered to be …xed in the short run. For simplicity, we will keep the number of …rms constant even in the long run.
We assume that all …rms have access to the same technology and input prices, and so the same di¤erentiable, sub-additive production function f (K; L) which satis…es f K , f L > 0, f LL , f KK < 0, and f KL > 0. Here K, say capital, priced at r, is considered to be the …xed factor while L, say labor, priced at w, is the short-run decision variable. 20 When K is …xed, the production function results in a cost function C SR = wL(q; K), where L(q; K) is the short-run input demand for L implicitly de…ned by
20 Brander and Spencer (1983) were the …rst to discuss Cournot competition following R&D investment, which, from the production and cost functions points of view is equivalent to our model. They also allowed for " ‡exible" production functions. As Cournot and Bertrand embody opposite incentives to use the strategic variable (R&D or capital) our results in this respect will mirror theirs. Needless to say, this is not the focus of this paper: rather, we are investigating the sources of ine¢ ciencies when pricing is e¢ cient, and also to what extent is Cournot a good reduced form of this pricing model.
Di¤erentiating both sides with respect to
. Di¤erentiating this with respect to q; we have that marginal cost is increasing and thus it can be inverted to yield the short-run supply function, S(p; K) = f 1 L (w=p; K), assumed in the previous section:
Di¤erentiating the short-run marginal cost with respect to K, we have that at any given quantity, marginal cost is reduced by investment:
Thus, …rms indeed have an incentive to sink capital into their technology.
We model the long-run competition as follows: In the …rst stage, …rms simultaneously install their "…xed"inputs, K J ; J = 1; 2; :::; N ; these are publicly observed before the second stage, where they engage in simultaneous personalized price setting. By our result in the previous section -and sequential rationality -it is common knowledge that the second stage leads to a unique equilibrium outcome, price p and quantity S(p ), parametrized by the capital structure, K, installed in the …rst stage.
Thus, given the capital choices of all other …rms, K J , …rm J's best response in the …rst stage solves
The …rst-order condition for this maximization problem is
where we have omitted the arguments of the functions for compactness. As we have discussed in the previous section, p = M C SR , so the above condition simpli…es to
This leads to the following immediate result.
Proposition 2
In equilibrium all …rms underinvest, not only relative to the …rst best but even conditional on their equilibrium output.
Proof. Note that in equilibrium the right-hand side of (5) Recall that in short-run equilibrium
Totally di¤erentiating both sides with respect to K J we obtain X
Solving for dp dK J we have dp
By (2),
Moreover, we have established already that marginal costs are increasing and thus S 0 (p ; K J ) > 0 for all …rms. The fact that demand is downward sloping completes the proof.
Note that Proposition 2 points to an e¤ect beyond the hold-up problem: It is not that …rms restrict investment because they will not reap its full bene…t. Rather, there is a market power e¤ect: taking into account that the …nal price decreases in their investment, the …rms have an additional reason to invest too little in "capital".
This is an example of the "puppy dog" ploy in Tirole's (1988) terminology. The following result provides further insight.
Corollary 1 If …rm I deviates in the …rst stage and increases its capital investment, the rest of the …rms will all reduce production:
Proof. By the proof of Proposition 2, dp dK J < 0: As S 0 (p ; K J ) > 0; the result follows.
That is, upon unilateral investment, the resulting decrease in price of course increases demand but it decreases the output of the competing …rms, thereby limiting the price drop. We will build on this insight in the following section.
It is worth noting that the proposition implies that the short-run marginal cost is strictly larger than the long-run marginal cost for the equilibrium level of output.
That is, even though the price equals the short-run marginal cost, the equilibrium is not e¢ cient: the price is higher than the long-run marginal cost (market power e¤ect) and …rms do not minimize costs (cost ine¢ ciency). This cost ine¢ ciency consequence of oligopoly is ignored when K is thought of as "capacity", notably as in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Davidson and Deneckere (1986) . Interpreting K as capacity, is a particular case of our model, assuming that f (K; L) is a Leontie¤ production function, except for the lack of di¤erentiability.
Cournot or not, revisited
We can now check what our two-stage model has to say in the discussion of whether the (long-run) Cournot model is a good proxy for a two-stage market, where …rms …rst take decisions that a¤ect the cost of output, and which they take as given when they set their prices.
Using (7), we …rst show that, given K J , the function q
Thus, we can invert q J (K J; K J ) and de…ne K 2s (q; K J ) as the level of K that a …rm would choose in the …rst stage if in the second stage equilibrium it sold q, given its rivals'capital choice, K J . Therefore, the …rst-stage best response problem, (3), can be rewritten as a choice of q J instead of K J :
The …rst-order condition for this problem is dp dq J q 2s
Let us turn to the best response in the one-shot Cournot model:
The …rst-order condition for this problem is
but observing that the last term on the left-hand side must be zero (investment must be e¢ cient conditional on output) we have
As, by Proposition 2, the last term on the left-hand side in (8) is positive, (8) and (9) together imply that dp dq J q 2s
Assume that it were the case that q
In that case we would necessarily have that p P C : Also, observe that dp dq J here refers to the change in the equilibrium price of our two-stage model that would result from an increase in K J so that, also in equilibrium, …rm J sells one more unit of output, while P 0 is the change in the market clearing price if -starting from the Cournot equilibrium -aggregate production is increased by one unit. Note that, evaluated at the same output levels, say q 2s J ; dp dq J < jP 0 j, since by Corollary 1 in our two stage model the increase in K J would result in a reduction of all other …rms' outputs. Therefore, we would also have that dp dq J q 2s
J . Consequently, if the demand function is not too concave dp dq J when the …xed input is used strictly below the e¢ cient level is in…nity, and so the demand would never cross total supply at such price. Also, and for the same reason, dp dq J = jP 0 j in that case. Indeed (and as long as the price is above the constant marginal cost below capacity), increasing capacity by a unit will increase aggregate output in exactly one unit. The rest of the …rms would still produce up to capacity in our model. Thus, with Leontie¤ technology our two-stage model would also predict, as the only symmetric equilibrium, the Cournot outcome. 21 Note that convexity of the demand simply means that the density of consumers is decreasing in their valuation: there are more poor people than rich. Alternatively, for an unconstrained demand function, but either a homothetic production function (proof available on request), or for the Vives (1986) technology -zero short-run marginal cost up to capacity, constant marginal cost thereafter -Proposition 3 also holds.
Discussion
Price competition should lead to marginal cost pricing even when …rms enjoy market power. As price competition is perhaps the best description of market behavior in the short run, we should expect that the price is indeed close to the marginal cost of …rms. However, we have been familiar with the distinction between long and short run since the days of our …rst college studies of Microeconomics. Certain decisions, input decisions in particular, are mostly taken as given, when prices are chosen, as Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) argued. Fixed production factors typically result in decreasing returns even when the technology is constant returns in the long run. Thus, marginal cost pricing and extraordinary pro…ts are compatible. What is important to understand is not so much the di¤erence between price and (short-run) marginal cost, but the incentives for the choice of levels and mix of inputs -and as a result, the level of output -arising from the strategic considerations present when …rms do have market power: when …rms'decisions a¤ect market output and price.
This is the main message of this paper. We have shown how these strategic considerations typically lead to both an ine¢ cient mix of inputs, with long-run decisions resulting in too low levels of these long-run determined inputs; and result in prices above long-run marginal cost.
We have also shown that, from a long-run point of view, and as argued by Davidson and Deneckere (1986) , (short-run) price competition results in more output than predicted by the Cournot model. According to our analysis, the discrepancy comes from the strategic interaction between the long-run decisions of the di¤erent …rms. When a …rm determines its own short-run cost function by investing in the long-run factor of production, it takes into account how these decisions will a¤ect future output decisions of rivals. A lower short-run marginal cost will be answered by rivals with a reduction in their own output. Thus, investments in these production factors have a lower impact on prices than what is predicted by the Cournot model.
The result is a stronger incentive on short-run cost reduction and therefore, a larger output.
Despite this stronger incentive to invest in the long-run factor, the equilibrium input mix shows ine¢ ciently low levels of it. As we have shown, this is associated with the e¤ect of the long-run factor on prices, and is a well-understood phenomenon 
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have presented a novel way of modelling price competition, which leads to marginal cost pricing -but positive pro…ts -as the unique equilibrium, without the need to specify rationing (when demand exceeds supply) or sharing 22 This is not an artifact of our assumption of always increasing average cost, and so marginal cost of 0 at q = 0. Indeed, assume the more standard, "U-shaped" average cost in the long run, and de…ne the minimum e¢ cient scale q = arg min (when supply exceeds demand) rules. It should therefore be a useful o¤-the-shelf workhorse model to embed in more complex scenarios.
We have also developed the most direct implications in a set-up with long-run competition, underlining the consequences of market power as ine¢ cient investments in the …xed factor. This analysis has also shed more light on the literature on twostage, Bertrand-Edgeworth competition.
such that if they receive the lowest o¤er, p, from the …rms in , they probabilistically accept them in proportion of the …rms'competitive supplies at p: they accept …rm J's o¤er with probability J (p; ) =
.
Assume all …rms but J make a price o¤er p to all consumers, and consider the best response of …rm J: P J (:): Let Q 1 be the (Lebesgue) measure of the set fi : P J (i) < p g and Q 2 be the measure of the set fi : P J (i) = p g. Then, the pro…ts of …rm J are not larger than p (Q 1 + J (p ; )Q 2 ) C J (Q 1 + J (p ; )Q 2 ). Indeed, a mass of consumers Q 1 accept J's o¤er of a price below p , and a mass of consumers Observing that by using the price schedule P J (i) p , …rm J sells exactly S J (p ),
we can see that P J (i) p is indeed a best response. Finally, as the consumers are indi¤erent, they are clearly happy mixing in the prescribed proportions. Note that the J i thus de…ned is indeed measurable.
We now show that there exists no other measurable equilibrium outcome with pure strategy price schedules. Assume the Law of Large Numbers is satis…ed for a continuum -in the index i -of independent random variables -on -with bounded variance, so that the quantity that …rm J sells in a hypothetical alternative equilibrium is q J (P; ) = R J i (P(i))di almost surely.
Note that for P to be part of an equilibrium it has to be that P J (i) C 0 J (q J (P; )) for almost all i such that J i (P(i)) > 0. Indeed, otherwise …rm J could pro…t by increasing her o¤er (up to, say, P J (i) = 1) to a positive measure of these consumers so as not to sell to them.
Next, note that each …rm must sell a positive amount in equilibrium. Indeed, 23 By the Law of Large Numbers this proportion is deterministic.
